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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
means of gaining release from confinement are not always adequate,
when balanced against possible consequences of permitting the
illegal custody to be used as a defense to the escape, there is no
question as to which is the better course. A prisoner, knowing he
may have such a defense if he escapes and is recaptured, might
be prone to try the escape first, and then, if recaptured, seek his
legal remedy. Assume a prisoner following such a course attempts
an escape and is halted by an armed guard. In his anxiety, he slays
the guard. Could he then claim he was illegally confined and had
every right to use all the force necessary in attempting to gain his
liberty? If such is the case, any force which he uses up to and
including homicide becomes an act of self-defense. In Meirs v.
State, 84 Tex. Crim. 161, 29 S.W. 1074 (1895), the defendant, in
seeking freedom, shot and killed a deputy sheriff who was attempt-
ing to tale the defendant into custody without a capias. The Texas
court there held it was self-defense. Would the West Virginia court
so hold today?
I. A. P., Jr.
CmnNAL LAw-RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TBIAL--CoURTRoom BumnM
TO Purnimc.-The defendant sought to waive her right to a public
trial during a murder prosecution so that she could testify in her
own behalf concerning certain abnormal sexual practices. The
trial court granted the motion and the public was excluded in order
to prevent emotional disturbance to the defendant. The defendant
was found guilty and the petitioners, certain members of the public,
sought a ruling on the exclusion order. Held, that it was within
the discretion of the court to exclude the public during the time the
defendant was on the stand, but, in the light of a statutory provi-
sion providing for open court, the trial judge's order was too broad.
The exclusion should have been limited to the time during which
the defendant testified. Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App.
2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956).
In this decision the court was faced with the task of balancing
two principles, the extent of the constitutional guarantee to a public
trial and the interest of the public to see that justice is done. A
better understanding of this problem may be had by briefly examin-
ing the treatment given these principles in other courts.
In federal law the Constitution guarantees that, "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
1
G.: Criminal Law--Right to a Public Trial--Courtroom Barred to Public
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1958
CASE COMMENTS
trial.... " U.S. CONST. amend VI. Almost without exception every
state, by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, has the same
requirement. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-269 (1947). As stated
in 1 Coo=EY, CoNsTrrtoNAL LDirrAnxoNs 647 (8th ed. 1927),
"the requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused;
that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly con-
demned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep
his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the
importance of their functions." Few courts have attempted to place
this right so precisely. Cf. State v. Poindexter, 231 La. 630, 92 So. 2d
890 (1956).
If a general rule were possible in this area, it would seem to be
that it rests within the sound discretion of the trial court to exclude
certain elements of the public from a criminal trial, but at no time
may all of the public be rejected over the objection of the defendant.
People v. Byrnes, 84 Cal. App. 2d 72, 190 P.2d 290 (1948), cert.
denied, 835 U.S. 847 (1948). More specifically, it has been held
that curiosity seekers attending a trial of a salacious nature may be
excluded. Weaver v. State, 33 Ala. App. 207, 31 So. 2d 593 (1947).
Anyone who may hinder the proper conduct of the trial may be
excluded. Scott v. State, 249 Ala. 304, 30 So. 2d 689 (1947). The
public whose admittance would cause an overcrowding of the court-
room may be excluded. Payne v. State, 226 Ark. 910, 295 S.W.2d 312
(1956). Youthful spectators may be excluded where the testimony
and evidence may have a demoralizing effect on their youthful
minds. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1949). And,
as in the principal case, the public may be excluded during the
testimony of a witness to prevent embarrassment and to facilitate a
fair trial. Reeves v. State, 264 Ala. 746, 88 So. 2d 561 (1956). From
these holdings it may be said that the main reasons for exclusion are
to protect the public morals, public health, and public safety, and
to effectuate the administration of justice. Scripps Co. v. Fulton,
164 Ohio St. 261, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955).
Several noteworthy objections have been raised in recent cases
concerning the exclusion of the uninterested spectator and the prac-
tical application of such a ruling. In State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360,
224 P.2d 500 (1950), the question is raised as to'who shall deter-
mine whether a spectator is drawn to the courtroom by idle curiosity
or by interest and what test shall be used to determine this. In
United States v. Kobli, supra, it is suggested that the idle spectator
who is usually the first one excluded in these cases may be the one
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who would direct public attention to acts of judicial oppression
overlooked by the more seasoned eye and that the franker and more
realistic attitude of the present day toward matters of sex precludes
a determination that all members of the public, mature and experi-
enced as well as immature and impressionable, may reasonably be
excluded on the grounds of public morals. A more substantial objec-
tion to exclusion was presented in Tanksley v. United States, 145
F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1944), a rape trial. The court speculated that
the public admitted to the courtroom may have included one who
had had sexual intercourse with the witness and that his presence
might arouse in the witness a fear or sense of shame that would
alter or weaken her testimony against the accused.
In balancing these two principles, the courts have taken dif-
ferent stands as to which right is the greater or should receive more
consideration. The California court has put the right to a public trial
on the same footing as the right to jury trial and the right to the
assistance of counsel. People v. Byrnes, supra. If this were true
there is no reason why the defendant should not have an absolute
right to waive the public and indeed the Third Circuit has treated
it as such. United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3rd Cir. 1949).
However, this is not the majority view. See Note, 36 ORE. L. 1Egv.
345 (1957). In a Montana decision the court has said that the right
is primarily for the benefit of the accused, but the situation likewise
involves questions of public interest and concern. State v. Keeler,
52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080 (1916). Here the defendant's right is
not as greatly favored and some interest is taken in the public right.
The New York court has said that unless the crime is one from
which the public is specifically excluded by the statute giving rise
to the right to a public trial, their exclusion will not be justified.
People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954). This is as close
as any court has come to saying that the public's right is of more
significance than the defendant's right. The majority of the state
courts follow the ruling set out in the Montana decision above.
State v. Poindexter, supra; State v. Haskins, 38 N.J. Super. 250,
118 A.2d 707 (1955); Neal v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 283, 192 P.2d 294
(1948). The courts have never been able to set one right above the
other because the basis for each is equally important and stem from
the traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials. In re Oliver,
supra.
The decisions, such as that of the principal case, holding that
the press and other news gathering agencies possess no greater
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rights than any other individual at a criminal trial, seem to con-
tradict one of the basic reasons asserted in support of the public's
right to attend such trials, that is to insure that the defendant is
fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. State v. Sheppard,
100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471, aff'd, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135
N.E.2d 340 (1955). As advanced in New York, Post Corp. v.
Liebowitz, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409, 148 N.E.2d 256 (1957), "the function
of publicity of a trial especially in the form of newspaper reporting
and comment, is one of the fundamental safeguards of a free
society." What better means would be available to subject the
trial to the fullest public scrutiny?
The court's decision in this case falls within the majority view
upholding the exclusion of the public from a criminal trial in this
instance. For a similar case see State v. Poindexter, supra.
It is submitted that, in the majority of these cases comprising
the exceptions to the general rule as to public trial, the word
"public" has been given the interpretation of "not secret". Since it
was the intention of the lawmakers to do away with secret trials,
the courts have effectuated that purpose. However, the presence of
the press in the courtroom, especially in the cases dealing with these
exceptions, might contribute an added incentive towards a fair
trial and certainly there could be no question of great concern as
to the public nature of the trial.
G. D. G.
Cmrnu .L LAw-TnLtL PRo uEDUm-IMPROPER REmAS OF
PROSECUTOR AS GROUNDS FOR REvERsAL.-From a judgment on con-
viction for first degree murder, defendant sought a writ of error.
Held, reversing the criminal court, although the evidence presented
a jury question, conviction should be reversed because of admission
of prejudicial evidence and because of highly prejudicial conduct
on the part of the prosecuting attorney. People v. Dukes, 146 N.E.2d
14 (Il. 1947).
In a criminal case the prosecuting attorney is placed in an
anomalous position. It is not only his duty to convict the defendant
but also, as an officer of the court, he must safeguard the rights of
all. Cf. State v. Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 57 S.E.2d 510 (1949). A
prosecuting attorney may prosecute vigorously, so long as he deals
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